EU, SCO AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

This work is the a research paper by our founder Emre Şentürk, submitted in May 2015 at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Groningen. The paper was submitted within the course “International Organisation” as part of the “International Relations/International Organisation” Bachelor programme. Its original title was "European Union or Shanghai Cooperation Organisation? Which organisation is more aligned with Turkey as regards foreign policy?".

I. Introduction

During the last century, international politics changed a lot. The rapidly increasing role of international organisations is one of the most remarkable changes. To successfully influence the international political stage, states nowadays rely more and more on channels and structures of international organizations. Where once states have pursued their goals by means of conflict, states today rely on cooperation, which is mostly channelled by international organisations. Just as every other state, the Republic of Turkey has its own goals in the field of foreign policy. In the course of the ‘2023 Vision’ plan, Turkey’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, outlined some major foreign affairs objectives of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration: “[Turkey] will play a determining role in international organisations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.”[[1]](#_ftn1) Comparing Turkey to the current top ten economies in the world, one can say that Turkey plays a modest role in international organizations. Where the European powers shape politics by pooling sovereignty in the European Union (hereafter EU), and Russia and China form and extend cooperation in Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereafter SCO), Turkey lacks membership in a regional organisation with a similar level of regional integration. Thus, Turkey’s economic and political potential is limited.

In the past, Turkey made great efforts to join the EU as a member state, which dates back to 1963. Several factors prevented the accession of Turkey to the EU, and in more than 50 years, the political landscape of Turkey has changed a lot. In the past 10 years, it tripled its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and has built the second largest army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This gave Turkey an increased role in international affairs. This confidence led public opinion on the accession to the EU to decline from more than 70% in favour of accession in 2004 to just 44% in 2013.[[2]](#_ftn2) Based on these developments and the stalled negotiations, the Turkish government has started to look out for alternative partners. Former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly expressed to abandon the EU membership bid for full membership in the SCO: “When things go wrong in such a way, you, as the prime minister of a country of 75 million, end up looking for other options. That's why I have recently said to Mr. Putin: ‘Take us into the Shanghai Five. Take us, and we say goodbye to the EU.”[[3]](#_ftn3) After three unsuccessful applications to the SCO as an Observer State, Turkey became Dialogue Partner to the organization in 2013.[[4]](#_ftn4) These are just few indicators of Turkey’s intentions without strong moves, but nonetheless strong enough to pay attention to them.

Refraining from questioning the probability of Turkey abandoning its EU membership bid in favour of a possible membership in the SCO, this work rather analyses which of these two regional organisations is more aligned with the foreign policy goals of Turkey, concentrating on power political, defence and security aspects of the foreign policies. In order to find an answer to this question, this work outlines the Turkish foreign policy objectives, which serve as the basis for the comparison between the two regional organizations’ foreign affairs/policy structural frameworks. The comparison of those frameworks will provide the necessary information to assess the level of alignment between the two parties and Turkey, respectively and will help to find out which organisation would rather help Turkey to achieve its goals.

II. Turkish Foreign Policy Goals

The Republic of Turkey has been governed by the Justice and Development Party for over 10 years. However, foreign affairs have gained a much bigger role within the AKP administration around the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In 2011, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu held a far-reaching speech on the goals that his party aims to achieve until 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Republic. In this speech, Davutoğlu said that “Turkey wants to play a much bigger role in the UN [emphasis added]”, because “if you have ten agenda items of the United Nations Security Council, at least eight or nine of them are directly related to Turkey”.[[5]](#_ftn5) While this ambition is directly related to national interest, Davutoğlu goes even further by stating that “[...] Turkey is and will be [an] even bigger contributor to this attempt re-establishing global order”.[[6]](#_ftn6) While this sounds similar to the United States of America’s ‘Manifest Destiny’, actions taken by Turkey are relatively moderate but steadily increase in intensity. For example, Turkey expanded its multilateral ties by gaining observer-state status to the African Union, founding the Turkic Council, becoming a Dialogue Partner to the SCO and developing ties to the Association of South-East Asian Nations by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.[[7]](#_ftn7)[[8]](#_ftn8)[[9]](#_ftn9) These factors indicate that Turkey seeks involvement in political processes and developments all over the world.

Militarily, Turkey is one of the last four states that still have troops deployed in Afghanistan, and they are still increasing the number.[[10]](#_ftn10) Turkey also engaged and still engages in a huge list of cross-border operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party (hereafter PKK), which is a terrorist organisation that seeks separation from Turkey.[[11]](#_ftn11) But Turkey’s involvement abroad is, in general, of a humanitarian nature. In the last ten years (which more or less coincide with the AKP rule), Turkey has increased humanitarian aid drastically, mostly to countries in the Middle East (especially Syria), being the 3rd largest provider in 2013 and the 6th largest worldwide over that time span.[[12]](#_ftn12) Furthermore, according to the UN Refugee Agency, Turkey hosts more than 1,7 million Syrian refugees and thus made therewith the largest contribution to this humanitarian crisis.[[13]](#_ftn13) These refugees are all entitled to Turkish citizenship and a work permit.[[14]](#_ftn14) The importance of foreign policy for Turkey has further been emphasised by Davutoğlu, who called it, besides the political and economic dimension, the third pillar of the government, which would aim at “an active, even pro-active peace-oriented foreign policy”.[[15]](#_ftn15) In order to reveal a specific foreign policy course from this vast amount of information, it is important to understand why Turkey focuses so heavily on the Middle East.

When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President in 2014, he announced that: “today not only Turkey has won, but Baghdad, Islamabad, Beirut, Skopje, Sarajevo, Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Ramallah, Nablus, Gaza, Jerusalem have won as well”[[16]](#_ftn16), thus referring to the cultural, political and economic centers of the former Ottoman Empire. Noticeably, he does not name the states themselves, but just the cities, which undermines their importance and evokes the feeling that the regions still belong to Turkey. Earlier in that year, he referred to the Balkans, Egypt and Palestinians as “his brothers”.[[17]](#_ftn17) Additionally, Erdoğan pointed out in a speech at the Council of Foreign Relations that: “The Palestinian issue, the problems in Iraq and Syria, Crimea, Balkans, are all issues that came about after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire” and because “[Turkish people] share religious and cultural values with all the countries and peoples in the region”, the experience can be used to “actively help resolve crises in the region”.[[18]](#_ftn18) Turkey’s foreign policy aspirations can be broken down to the goal of gaining regional hegemony in the Middle East. This is largely caused by a feeling of responsibility for the former Ottoman territories and is mainly carried out by peaceful means, but leads the benefiting state into dependency on Turkey. Two other actions in Turkey’s foreign policy are to fight terrorism and separatism along its borders and expand its role in broader world politics through becoming active in international organizations. It can be said that national interest is very central, and realism is the main approach to world affairs.

III. European Union Foreign Policy Structures

In order to understand the EU’s foreign policy, this work examines it with a three-step approach. First, the articulation of the objectives sets the basis for the general course of this field of policy. These are formulated in the Treaty on European Union under Article 21:

“2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

• (a) safeguard its values, [...]
• (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, [...] 1 (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.”[19]

Second, the institutional structures have to be examined. The EU draws its powers from the pooled sovereignty of its members. Even though it does not possess full competence in the field of foreign policy, member states have mostly aligned their political courses in external affairs. There might be minor differences in different cases, but member states are unanimous in the general course; otherwise, they would not have established corresponding organs.

The European External Action Service (hereafter EEAS) is the diplomatic organ of the EU, which is charged with the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter CFSP).[[20]](#_ftn20) This policy aims at extending capabilities for joint external actions in conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU has therefore established battle groups under the CFSP and can request ad hoc forces by the EU members under the Common Security and Defence Policy (hereafter CSDP), because of its mutual assistance and solidarity clause.[[21]](#_ftn21) These forces can be deployed in: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian & rescue tasks, military advice & assistance, conflict prevention & peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking & post-conflict stabilisation.[[22]](#_ftn22)

Third, a look at the actions by the EEAS will not only provide an overview of the scope of the missions, but also hint at the nature of the EU’s foreign policy. The EEAS operates several missions worldwide, commissioned with one or more of the aforementioned tasks. Where the intentions and regional interests are very clear in some missions, others lack the direct link to Europe. The European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia and the EU capacity building effort (EUCAP NESTOR) are examples of missions that serve a regional interest. The missions protect vessels through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which are important economic and geopolitical areas[[23]](#_ftn23), but are under constant threat of piracy. Additionally, EUCAP ”assists host countries in developing a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of the maritime security, including counter-piracy and maritime governance”.[[24]](#_ftn24) Another example is the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which has the aim “to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, with a specific focus on the judiciary”.[[25]](#_ftn25) This is in their regional interest, as it maintains peace within the geographical borders of Europe. Less clear are the intentions of the EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) in the Central African Republic or the EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC) in Congo. While both advise and train the respective state’s armies to enhance stability and promote peace in those regions,[[26]](#_ftn26) one cannot link these missions directly to regional interests of the EU.

These examples and several more missions (e. g. EUAM Ukraine) show that the EU aims at stabilising the security situation within Europe. Additionally, the EU is acting as an idealistic power by launching global missions mostly in post-conflict stabilisation to spread its liberal values and act as an international peace-promoter. Thus, one can say that the EU perceives stability and security in regions around Europe as important as its own security situation in the EU territory.

IV. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Foreign Policy Structures

Due to the lesser extent of regionalisation, the SCO does not possess any organs commissioned with the management of external affairs, other than the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (hereafter RATS). This body “is intended to assist in the coordination and collaboration of the Parties’ competent agencies in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism”[[27]](#_ftn27). This shall be reached through informational and operational activities, such as assisting and preparing anti-terrorist operations, training military personnel and gathering data. The SCO has a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but this body deals with “issues related to day-to-day activities” and “consultation on international problems”[[28]](#_ftn28), without being competent to launch missions like the EEAS. The main decision-making organ is the Council of Heads of State, which is “the supreme SCO body”.[[29]](#_ftn29) Decisions are taken by consensus, which means that members still have full sovereignty within the organization. Furthermore, the SCO does not engage in international missions like the EU does, but practices military drills, like the “Peace Mission 2014”.[[30]](#_ftn30) This information reflects the organisation's focus, but a look at the Charter of the SCO provides a more detailed view. The SCO desires “cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order [emphasis added]”[[31]](#_ftn31) as outlined in its Charter.

There are several differences between the goals of the EU. First of all, the main focus of the EU is international, whereas the SCO focuses mainly on regional security and stability. Secondly, the EU has strongly normative elements in its goals. The rule of law, cooperation, human rights and freedoms are pointed out explicitly in the agenda and several missions are solely committed to serve those norms. The SCO, in contrast, leaves much room for interpretation of its normative agenda, which is the aforementioned order. In its principles, the SCO states that members shall be, among other principles, referring to state sovereignty, “seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas“.[[32]](#_ftn32) Even though the SCO members want to promote a new order, the weak elaboration of its normative goals shows that these are not the focal points of the organisation but rather state-centric. Another issue is present in almost every document of the SCO: combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism outlines definitions, goals and actions on a very high level of cooperation. In addition to informational and legal cooperation, the SCO members also “cooperate in the sphere of prevention, search and suppression of the deeds”[[33]](#_ftn33), which can be operational under article 6(10): “[...] rendering of practical assistance on forestalling the deeds”.[[34]](#_ftn34)

The nature of the SCO has not changed since its birth. It was founded from mutual security concerns of its members about the neighbouring countries and transnational criminal threats. These concerns also avoided further regionalisation, which mostly leads to a loss of state sovereignty. Thus, the SCO takes decisions by consensus, which has to be found by the heads of the member states. Its foreign policy can be described as security-oriented, state-centric and aiming at political stability.

V. Conclusion

The comparison of both regional organisations has revealed the dissimilar focal points. Whereas the EU is operating in many missions around the world, the SCO limits its operational activities to military drills and counter-terrorism operations in the region. The EU further not only serves its own interests, but also acts as an idealistic power, thus having ideological components in its operations. Due to the different political situations and threats in Central Asia, the SCO has less interest in expanding its normative agenda without resolving the most imminent problems. Therewith, the question is which organisation is more aligned with Turkey as regards foreign policy.

As Turkey strives for leadership and regional power in the Middle East, these aspirations conflict with the nature of the EU as a regional organisation, which pools sovereignty and aligns the political courses of the members in order to act as a unit. Thus, leadership and hegemony aspirations are in opposition to the principles of the EU. Only in the field of operational activities, Turkey and the EU act similar, focussing on cooperation with other international organisations and humanitarian aid. The SCO’s state-centric approach to international politics is more aligned with the Turkish foreign policy, which is mainly based on its neo-Ottoman motions. The first points of Article 2 in the SCO Charter condemns the use of hard powers, but do not touch upon the use of soft powers, which is also in line with the Turkish course of international humanitarian actions. Furthermore, with this low level of regional integration, Turkey’s sovereignty would not be diminished, and its hegemony aspirations would not be impaired. Additionally, the SCO highly serves Turkey’s interests in the field of security. Surrounded by crises in neighbouring countries and terrorist groups, Turkey would benefit from the RATS, which could be of great help in the fight against the PKK. Thus, politically and from a security point of view, a Turkish membership in the SCO would highly contribute to stabilisation in the region.

Finally, the comparison of the different structures of these two organisations shows that Turkey would be better off as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, at least as far as their goals in international affairs are concerned.

[[1]](#_ftnref1) Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives,"Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives__-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa (accessed Nov. 22, 2011).

[[2]](#_ftnref2) Nesibe Hicret Soy, “Turkish support for EU membership on decline, opinion divided on NATO,” Today's Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkish-support-for-eu-membership-on-decline-opinion-divided-on-nato_326761.html (accessed Sept. 18, 2013).

[[3]](#_ftnref3) “US: Turkey’s Shanghai membership would be ’interesting’,” Today's Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_us-turkeys-shanghai-membership-would-be-interesting_305429.html (accessed Jan. 29, 2013).

[[4]](#_ftnref4) The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, “Signing ceremony of Memorandum on granting Turkey SCO dialogue partner status held in Almaty” (2013), http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=410 (accessed Apr. 04, 2013).

[[5]](#_ftnref5) Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives__-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa (accessed Nov. 22, 2011).

[[6]](#_ftnref6) Ibid.

[[7]](#_ftnref7) “Turkey and the African Union,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-united-nations-organization-and-turkey_.en.mfa.

[[8]](#_ftnref8) “The Cooperation Council Of Turkic Speaking States,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-konseyi-en.en.mfa.

[[9]](#_ftnref9) “Turkey’s Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/asean.en.mfa.

[[10]](#_ftnref10) Metin Gürcan, “Turkish military support to Afghanistan rises,” AL-MONITOR, Nov. 20 2014,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/turkey-afghanistan-military-presence.html.

[[11]](#_ftnref11) Ulkumen Rodoplu, Jeffrey Arnold and Gurkan Ersoy, “Terrorism in Turkey,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18, no. 2 (2003): p.152.

[[12]](#_ftnref12) “Turkey,” Global Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/turkey.

[[13]](#_ftnref13) “Syria Regional Refugee Response,” The UN Refugee Agency, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (last updated 4 May, 2015).

[[14]](#_ftnref14) “Syrian refugees to be given identity cards and work permits,” Today's Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_syrian-refugees-to-be-given-identity-cards-and-work-permits_361151.html.

[[15]](#_ftnref15) Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives__-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa (accessed Nov. 22, 2011).

[[16]](#_ftnref16) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “PRESIDENTIAL VICTOR ERDOĞAN’S BALCONY SPEECH,“ Republic of Turkey Office of the Prime Minister Directorate General of Press and Information, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/english/agenda/presidential-victor-erdogans-balcony-speech/65403.

[[17]](#_ftnref17) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “FULL TEXT: Turkish PM Erdoğan's post-election 'balcony speech',” Hürriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/full-text-turkish-pm-erdogans-post-election-balcony-speech.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64341&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 31 March 2014).

[[18]](#_ftnref18) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Turkish President Erdogan on ISIS and Regional Security,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkish-president-erdogan-isis-regional-security/p33488.

[[19]](#_ftnref19) Nigel Foster, EU Treaties & Legislation 2014-2015 (New York: Oxford Press, 2014), 10.

[[20]](#_ftnref20) Geert De Baere and Ramses A. Wessel, “EU Law and the EEAS: Of Complex Competences and Constitutional Consequences,” (paper presented at the conference The EU’s Diplomatic System: post-Westphalia and the European External Action Service, Europe House, London, UK, 19 November 2013), http://www.utwente.nl/bms/pa/research/wessel/wesselconf11.pdf.

[[21]](#_ftnref21) Nigel Foster, EU Treaties & Legislation 2014-2015 (New York: Oxford, 2014), 16.

[[22]](#_ftnref22) Ibid.

[[23]](#_ftnref23) Hussain Al-Yadoomi, “The Strategic Importance Of The Bab Al-Mandab Strait,” U. S. Army War College, April 9, 1991, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a236804.pdf, 1.

[[24]](#_ftnref24) “EUCAP Nestor (Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean),” European Union External Action, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-nestor/mission-description/index_en.htm.

[[25]](#_ftnref25) “Mission Description,” European Union External Action, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/mission-description/index_en.htm.

[[26]](#_ftnref26) “List of EU Civilian and Military Missions,” London School of Economics, http://www. lse. ac. uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUpdfs/EU-Civilian-and-Military-Missions-since-2003. pdf.

[[27]](#_ftnref27) Agreement Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, Article 3.

[[28]](#_ftnref28) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter, Article 7.

[[29]](#_ftnref29) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter, Article 5.

[[30]](#_ftnref30) Shannon Tiezzi, “China Hosts SCO’s Largest-Ever Military Drills,” The Diplomat, Aug. 29, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-hosts-scos-largest-ever-military-drills/.

[[31]](#_ftnref31) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter, Article 1.

[[32]](#_ftnref32) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter, Article 2.

[[33]](#_ftnref33) The Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, Article 2(1).

[[34]](#_ftnref34) The Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, Article 6(10).